ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The topic of corporate governance has entered the agendas of many boards of directors in recent years. It is no longer a topic for idealists or academics. More corporate leaders are convinced by the necessity of good corporate governance. The Asian financial crisis, that started in 1997, partly originating from the prolonged recession in Japan in the early 1990s (Sachs, 1998) , adversely affected the performance of many East Asian economies. Malaysia was not spared from the contagious effects that followed throughout 1998. It is generally believed that a lack of sound corporate governance was, to a certain extent, a major reason for this economic crisis in the East Asian region (D'Cruz, 1999; Khas, 2002; Kim, 1998) .
Apart from that, the tragic downfall of worldwide corporate giants, which came later than the Asian financial crises, such as Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Enron, Xerox, Worldcom, and Parmalat, left a deep impression on the corporate world in general. As in the case of the Asian crisis, most of the corporate failures, including Enron and Worldcom, could be said to have been caused by a lack of good corporate governance. In addition, the recent US accounting scandals associated with the global financial crisis (notably the Lehman Brothers bank failure) hastened the understanding of the wide-ranging effect that poor corporate governance can have on a country's economy through its effects on the capital markets. Such incidents adversely affected public confidence in the reliability of corporate reporting.
According to Graham, Litan and Sukhtankar (2002) , the cost of poor corporate governance is borne heavily by minority shareholders, a significant issue in emerging markets like Malaysia where many public companies are family owned. Remuneration, the selection of board members, weak investor relations, a low level of transparency in disclosing information by companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia (BMB), formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), and the ineffectiveness of regulatory agencies in enforcing legislation by punishing offenders and protecting minority shareholders, are all reasons attributed to the collapse of several Malaysian companies (Mohamad, 2002) . These are the common problems which are in the debates on corporate governance. These unsolved issues clearly show that the exercise of a rule-based conformance approach did not work and has resulted in corporate governance failure.
Though the term "Corporate Governance" is recognised universally, there is no one acceptable definition of its usage. It is essentially about the control and direction of companies, exercised by their directors or those holding power and authority. Studies of corporate governance focus on a wide range of issues such as legal compliance with company regulation, the structure of company boards and their authority, best practices and reporting and accountability systems, and how these add value to a corporation's performance.
Reviewing corporate annual reports has become one of the commonly used techniques to analyse corporate governance practices (Horwath, 2002) . Though such a technique is noncomprehensive in nature, the analysis could provide, to a certain extent, the relevant indicators of corporate governance actual practices. However, the conduct of extensive field work in analysing corporate governance practices remains limited because the main sources of data used to evaluate company corporate governance practices are based on publicly available information such as the corporate annual reports. In fact, actual corporate governance practices go beyond the materials that are published in corporate annual reports. Ticking off boxes for compliance only leads to a false sense of security that the right judgements and right actions are being taken. Fasterling (2006) commented on the importance of honest and accurate reporting as a fundamental value for the effectiveness of disclosure rules. He further argues that if honest reporting is not reliable, and must instead depend solely on enforcement and verification measures, disclosure rules rapidly become inefficient, because inaccurate disclosures are difficult to detect and where disclosures are accurate, they still may have hidden implications that are difficult to uncover (Kraakman, 2004) .
The contributors to the present worldwide corporate governance discussion share one common objective, and that is to restore public faith in the integrity of business, (Fasterling, 2006) . The concept of integrity is related to consistency of values and actions or words and
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
The Malaysian Securities Commission (SC) revealed that it had uncovered "a variety of breaches and mismanagement" by directors and senior officers of a number of companies (Oh, 2003) . The offences include insider trading and market manipulation, as well as corporate governance transgressions such as purchasing assets at inflated prices, selling assets at deflated values, submission of false or misleading information, schemes to defraud, and misuse of proceeds from capital-raising exercises. Governance, 2007) have provided a framework and structures for good governance reporting architecture. Nevertheless organizations are ultimately controlled and run by human beings and in order to promote transparent corporate governance reporting, voluntary acts from within, based on sincerity, rather than conforming to an external requirement are crucial (Salleh & Ahmad, 2008) .
Corporate governance and business ethics were the main concern with regards to integrity value in Malaysian private sector. Various scandals and malpractices, involving both foreign and local companies, have time and again demonstrated the need to uphold good governance (Razak, 2005) . Corporate crimes such as corporate frauds have tarnished the credibility and integrity of the private sector among investors and the public (Razak, 2005) . The above problems underscore the key point of the importance of adopting good management practices in every sphere of the corporate sector, in order to promote integrity and sustain economic prosperity (Razak, 2005) .
In Malaysia, annual reports are seen to be less effective in conveying useful information to users due to the disclosure of information that is no longer relevant or that current users demand more from the contents of annual reports. Che found that users demanded more from the contents of the annual reports and feels that annual reports failed to convey useful information. Users were also considering alternative sources of information about the companies as more reliable, trusted and easily accessible relative to the firm's annual reports. In addition, the contents of the information disclosed appear not to cater to the needs of investors. There might also be certain fundamental information that is lacking in the Malaysian disclosure framework as a study conducted by Standard and Poors (2004) also revealed that most of the companies in Malaysia still fell short of global disclosure practice (Standard & Poors, 2004; Toh, 2004) . This has been the dilemma for security regulators in assessing company corporate governance practice which currently are not being disclosed in company annual reports. The issue of corporate governance reporting and corporate governance practice is not yet resolved.
THE AIMS OF THIS PAPER
The aims of this paper are to review various means of assessing corporate governance practices and to report the results of a study which determined the views of experts and practitioners about the reporting of corporate governance in Malaysia.
This research tries to uncover the corporate governance dilemma in Malaysian Government Link Companies. The research identified issues or problems pertaining to corporate governance reporting in Malaysia and how these problems can be resolved.
LITERATURE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT
A review of previous studies sees their focus based on the corporate governance attributes used such as the composition of a board (including the roles of independent directors, board leadership (separate or dual roles for CEO and Chair), and independence of audit committees. More recently the focus has turned to assessment of compliance with governance best practices and how these can be assessed.
In emerging economies, the quality of corporate governance can vary enormously. Recognizing the need for a benchmark for corporate governance standards, Standard & Poors introduced its new service called Corporate Governance Scores (CGS) (Anonymous, 2001) . Their analysis begins with an evaluation of governance issues at the country level in order to determine the extent to which external forces at the macro level support governance practices at the company level. Then, this is followed by the second part of the analysis which evaluates corporate governance practices at the level of individual companies. Using a synthesis of the OECD's and other international codes and guidelines of corporate governance practices as cornerstones of the scoring methodology, Standard & Poors' scores a company's overall governance practices and four other components: ownership structure; financial stakeholder relations; financial transparency and information disclosure; and board structure and process. The extent to which a company adopts and conforms to international codes and guidelines of good corporate governance practices is reflected by the award of Corporate Governance Scores (CGS) on a scale from CGS-1 (lowest) to CGS-10 (highest). The four components described earlier, all contribute to the CGS and receive individual scores from 1 to 10. There are altogether 100 governance attributes examined in Standard & Poor's analysis (Anonymous, 2001 ).
According to the Corporate Governance Ratings and Research by Deminor Rating (2007) , the important corporate governance themes that received strong attention during the rating process are director's independence, splitting the roles of Chairman and CEO and the audit and non-audit services provided by the external auditors. The ratings criteria used to benchmark the governance of a company were included in an analysis grid containing over 300 governance indicators. The more than 300 criteria that make up the Deminor's Rating are classified into four main categories: rights and duties of shareholders; range of take-over defences; disclosure and governance; and board structure. Deminor Rating's research was done on ten selected European countries: the UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden and Belgium.
Several studies suggest that investors use such ratings in investment decisions. Ernst & Young Malaysia and BP Malaysia Sdn. Bhd (2002) cited the results of a Credit Lyonnais ("CLSA") study on corporate governance in emerging markets published in February 2002 which suggests that investors prefer companies with high or improving corporate governance practices in the respective markets. The factors and weightings considered by CLSA for their country rankings are:
Clear, transparent and comprehensive rules and regulations (10% weighting); 2.
Commitment and effective enforcement of rules and regulations (30% weighting); 3.
Political and regulatory environment affecting corporate governance and ability of companies to maximise value without arbitrary restrictions (20% weighting); 4.
Adoption of International Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (20% weighting); and 5.
Institutional mechanisms to promote awareness and a culture of good governance (20% weighting).
A study by Cheah and Kean (2002) reports the findings of a project that examined corporate reporting and information disclosure among Malaysian commercial banks. As a benchmark against which Malaysian banks are compared, disclosure items used by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in its 2000 banks disclosure survey were applied to Malaysian banks. The Basel survey was categorized into twelve sections covering quantitative, strategic and methodological information to enable better evaluation by market participants. It focused on credit risk, which understandably is the predominant risk exposure faced by commercial banks. The researchers examined the 2001 annual reports of a total of 18 Malaysian banks. The sample consisted of three separate groups: four domestic banks listed on the KLSE, six domestic non-listed banks and eight foreign banks. The disclosure rates of the three separate groups were then compared to that of the Basel survey. The results indicate that although Malaysian domestic banks have undergone considerable industry shakeout and consolidation, they are still somewhat unsophisticated and disclosed far less information compared with banks in the Basel sample. Even though, in general, Malaysian banks have met some of the international standards, further substantial efforts to disclose more are required if they wish to improve corporate governance practices and compete on international scale. Thompson and Hung (2002) conducted a corporate governance study in Singapore. They constructed a Corporate Governance Scorecard based on the guidelines from the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance in order to evaluate the level of compliance with the Code as well as to gauge their corporate governance practices. The study also tested for an association between corporate governance and various corporate attributes including profitability, size and age. In addition, they looked at the impact of governance mechanisms such as board structure, capital structure and ownership structure on the profitability of the sample companies. The scoring data indicates an overall low level of compliance with the Code. The study also found a negative relationship between corporate governance and profitability; and also between company performance and separated leadership structure. However, arguably, the proxy used for performance was profitability (measured only by ROE), which is subject to the limitations of such a measure.
Another study conducted by Weir and Laing (2002) examined other corporate governance attributes, such as duality, number of non-executive directors (at 3 non-executive directors) and independence of the non-executive directors in association with companies' performance (measured by return on assets, ROA).
Similar to the above study, Weir and Laing (2002) also looked into degree of compliance with the governance code (Cadbury Report), finding that a majority of companies complied with the recommendations. However, the relationships between the governance indicators and company performance were tentative. The number of executive directors and percentage of independent non-executive directors failed to show a positive relationship with performance although duality was found to be an effective governance mechanism. The authors concluded that these results suggested that the role of non-executive directors and independent non-executive directors was more persuasive rather than taking a monitoring role. The duality characteristic was expected to show a negative relationship, but the result turned out to be positive. The researchers concluded that in certain circumstances, duality was an effective governance mechanism, whereby the benefits of duality outweigh the separation. In conclusion, they suggested that the Cadbury Report was too prescriptive; therefore, it should allow some flexibility.
On the other hand, a contrary result was found by Desai et.al (2003) on the CEO duality effect on firm performance measured by cumulative abnormal return (CARs) on stock value. According to Desai et al (2003) , firms without CEO duality show a positive abnormal return, while firms with CEO duality demonstrate negative abnormal return on stock value.
Besides that, CEO compensation issues and what are the best measures to formulate CEO compensation have always been debated. Usually, a remuneration committee is set up to determine the CEO compensation policy. According to agency theory, there should be a link between CEO compensation and his/her contribution to the firm's performance. Baum et. al. (2004) conducted a study of CEO compensation effects on corporate performance using economic profit (economic value added, economic value added (EVA) and market value added, (MVA). The objective of the study was to analyze the relationship between a company's performance (EVA and MVA) and CEO compensation. The result portrayed that market value added (MVA) was closely related to the CEO compensation as compared to EVA. This result indicated that economic profit was another strong determinant of the CEO compensation rather than other traditional accounting measures such as EPS, ROI, ROCE and stock price.
The White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia (OECD, 2003) identified five key issues in developing corporate governance: managing shareholder rights; equity in shareholder treatment; disclosure and transparency of performance, investment and risk; and, role and protection of shareholders and board structure. Based on this framework, Malaysia received a relatively low CG score compared to its other Asian counterparts such as Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines.
In a study of reporting, IFAC based its framework for improving corporate governance on three key assumptions: credibility in financial reporting is both a national and international issue; corporate financial reporting involves an information supply chain that requires quality assurance at all points; and, integrity of both individuals and institutions involved in the supply of information is essential.
Two Australian studies (Howarth, 2002 (Howarth, , 2003 Wespac, 2003) critically analyzed the use of corporate annual reports as the main source of data for their corporate governance projects. Horwath proceeded with the development of the Corporate Governance rating for Australia. Wespac (2003) specifically examined the Corporate Governance Statement of financial institutions in Australia and assessed their corporate governance reporting on five broad criteria: board structure, committees of the board, audit governance, remuneration policy and corporate responsibility. Fasterling (2006) referred to the importance of honesty and accurate reporting as a fundamental value for the effectiveness of disclosure rules, but if it is not reliable, then enforcement and verification measures will be considered as the solution. But again effective enforcement required not only a non corrupt independent or governmental authority which has power to initiate investigations, report irregularities, and impose sanctions, but also that such authorities are endowed with sufficient financial means and a highly trained staff to carry out their tasks (Fasterling, 2006) . He further commented that the cost of these efforts needs to be justifiable with the benefit that can be experienced from accurate disclosure and act accordingly.
Although companies in Malaysia are required to comply with the corporate governance guidelines, no study has canvassed the opinions of those involved in making corporate governance decisions.
METHODOLOGY
This study adopted a qualitative approach to uncover issues in corporate governance reporting and how to address these issues. As the aim of the study was to discover issues in corporate governance reporting and how to address the issues, structured interviews were conducted with the company directors and company top management selected from the top 100 companies in Malaysia (i.e. the practitioners)(Bursa Malaysia, 2008) , and Malaysian corporate governance associations, policy makers and academics (i.e. the corporate governance experts).
The research questions addressed were: 1. What were the major issues in corporate governance in Malaysia? 2.
How accurate was corporate governance reporting? What was poorly reported? 3.
How reliable was corporate governance reporting as an indicator of the quality and integrity of company management? 4.
How could some of these issues be addressed?
The interview sample which represents both practitioners and corporate governance experts provides an in-depth gauge of the issues. As the interviewees have in depth knowledge of the subject, they can provide rich information to the study (Babbie, 2002) . A total of 12 interviews were conducted with a sample of 4 practitioners and 8 corporate governance experts. While this is a relatively small sample, the twelve respondents showed considerable agreement in their views which suggests that the results are probably representative of the sector.
The interviews were conducted between 15 th of September 2008 to 31 st of January 2009, at offices located around Klang Valley Malaysia. Personal interview was the preferred method of gathering the required information because this approach gives more attention to understanding corporate governance issues in a holistic and meaningful way. From the interview exercise, issues related to corporate governance reporting were discovered. Sources of data were taped transcripts of the interviews and the detailed notes taken by the researcher during the interviews. These data were analysed for identification of themes and similar responses. The tables report the number of times that responses were volunteered by the respondents unless indicated otherwise.
This study was part of a larger study of governance in Malaysia. This paper reports the results of the study that determined what the corporate sector believed were the critical issues in governance reporting in Malaysia.
FINDINGS

Issues with Corporate Governance in Malaysia
In the case of Malaysian Government Link Companies, there is an unsolved issue as regards to corporate governance reporting. Similar to Che this study confirmed that current users demand more from the contents of annual reports and in addition, the contents of the information disclosed might not cater to the needs of the investors. This has resulted in users now considering other sources of information about the companies to be more reliable, trusted and easily accessible relative to the firm's annual reports. The interviewees' views are typified by the following: All of the practitioners believed that there are unsolved issues pertaining to corporate governance in Malaysia. As for the corporate governance expert group, two respondents believe that, there are no issues pertaining to corporate governance in Malaysia since the companies comply with the mandatory listing requirement. The balance of the expert group believes otherwise. The majority of the practitioners feel that companies only comply and report on mandatory requirements and need to improve on voluntary disclosure. This has resulted in having reports that are low in transparency. Half of the expert group agreed and have the same opinion as the practitioner group.
We wouldn't want to report too many things in the annual report. As long as we comply with the Bursa Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) listing requirement that should be good enough (Practitioner) Information reported is not transparent enough and there is a need for the information to be verified or certify for the trueness by an independent party. The current mandatory approach are not promoting integrity in corporate governance reporting, it should be change to aspiration approach (Corporate Governance Experts)
Company are good in reporting the mandatory requirement which is being spell out in the listing requirement, but lacking in disclosure of best practice in corporate governance which is the voluntary disclosure (Practitioner).
Another major issue which the expert group considered as crucial is the quality of the directorships including: board knowledge, experience, capability, integrity values, attitudes and leadership values. Only one practitioner highlights this issue during the interview.
Quality of the board is crucial because it influence the corporate culture. Good corporate governance starts from the top which then flows down. They are the setting tones (Corporate governance expert).
Risk management and flow of information within the organization are other issues that the practitioners feel need to be improved as it is considered as a critical issue.
Other issues which the expert group highlighted during the interview were the monitoring and enforcement of the Malaysian code on corporate governance. The expert group were concerned with monitoring and enforcement in Malaysia which they feel needs to improve. They also believe that the Malaysian code on corporate governance should tailored to the nature and structure of the Malaysian listed companies the majority of which are family based and state owned companies.
Accuracy of Reporting
The majority of the corporate governance expert group believes that corporate governance reporting needs to be reviewed by Bursa Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) since companies tend to report only on mandatory requirements but tend not to provide voluntary disclosures. Bursa Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) as an independent party can also provide assurance of the trueness of the information reported. Corporate governance just provides legal boundaries for company to operate but not assuring the reliability of the information. That is the reason why report on corporate governance is questionable since it is only guided by the code but not enforced by law. Half of the practitioners also agree with this statement. Honest and accurate reporting is the fundamental value for the effectiveness of disclosure rules (Fasterling, 2006) .
Corporate governance report is not like the financial report where it is govern by law and validated by an auditor (Expert group).
Disclosure
Half of the practitioners believed that information pertaining to director remuneration and any other benefits received are poorly reported. They feel that this is a sensitive issue on which companies do minimal reporting. This may be due to the nature and structure of Malaysian listed companies; family based and state owned companies. As for the expert group, they feel that information related to director performance, effectiveness and training is poorly reported. This is another controversial issue on which companies do minimal reporting. The issues being highlighted by both groups share one common theme: information related to the board of directors. Table 4 shows the responses on issues which are poorly reported in the companies' annual report.
The expert group also suggest that information related to the assessment conducted in the companies and action taken after assessment is poorly reported.
Assessment conducted in the company is just on the surface, eg YES or NO; and there is no report or data pertaining to the action taken after the assessment. There is lack of quantitative data and if there is a report, it is very generic (Expert group).
Other issues which are poorly reported are integrity and accountability issues; risk management and internal control and information on shareholders. All respondents from both groups agreed that greater disclosure can perhaps solve many of the above issues in corporate governance. Fasterling (2006) argues that inaccurate disclosures are difficult to detect and where disclosures are accurate, they still may have hidden implications that are difficult to uncover (Kraakman, 2004) . Respondents agreed:
Company should be more transparent in reporting, more accountable and they should do auditing and forensic accounting (Practitioner).
Greater disclosure perhaps can help in this issue but enforcement and monitoring are really important. Revising the company's act might also help in addressing this issue (Expert group).
Assessment of the Quality and Integrity of Management
Half of the practitioners do not believe that corporate governance reporting can be a reliable indicator of the quality and integrity of the company management. More than half of the expert group does not believe the statement unless the information is being verified by an independent party. Fasterling (2006) commented on the importance of honest and accurate reporting as a fundamental value for the effectiveness of disclosure rules. He then further argues that if honest reporting is not reliable, disclosure rules rapidly become inefficient, and must instead depend solely on enforcement and verification measures.
There was a consensus among the expert group regarding this matter. They feels that external auditing on corporate governance reporting will help in disclosing the integrity practices since it is an independent opinion which reviews and validates the reported information. This practice needs to be on voluntary or aspiration driven not on mandatory or enforcement basis. The spin-off of from this exercise will be, improving the corporate image. It will also promote and indirectly enforce good practice of corporate governance in the organization.
Two out of four practitioners agreed with the expert group opinion whereas the other practitioners are not sure whether external auditing of corporate governance reporting are practical and suitable approach in disclosing the organization integrity practices . Among the issues that the practitioner concern when corporate governance being audited are, additional cost incurred by the company, a qualified compliance officer might have to be appointed and the auditing approach. They suggest that the approach must be strategic and operational.
The concern issues are in agreement with what's being highlighted by Fasterling (2006) . He highlight on the issues of achieving effective enforcement where not only a non corrupted independent or governmental authority which has power to initiate investigations, report on irregularities, and impose sanctions are required, but also that such authorities should endowed with sufficient financial means and a highly trained staff to carry out the tasks. He further commented that the cost of these efforts needs to be justifiable with the benefit that can be experienced from accurate disclosure and act accordingly.
Corporate Governance Issues not Currently Addressed by Regulations
Leadership, board roles and board quality are areas which receive inadequate emphasis in corporate governance regulations. All of the practitioner respondents and half the expert group agree with this proposition. Corporate governance auditing is another issue that both groups feel may help to address the current issues in corporate governance. Other issues that corporate governance does not address sufficiently are integrity values among board members, investment information, public roles in promoting good corporate governance practice and corporate social responsibility. Table 9 show the respondent suggestions on how to instil integrity value in a corporation.
The entire practitioner group suggested that providing training and increased awareness among staff members regarding integrity values would be a good way to instil integrity within the company. Fasterling (2006) also agrees that increasing awareness of human values such as honesty and integrity would be the best approach to address this issue. On the other hand, the expert group believes that an adequate system, stress on values and process rather than on rules and regulation might help in promoting integrity in a company.
Provide training and promote awareness on integrity among staff member; example ESQ training (Practitioner).
Integrity in business is a must for all corporations as it able to instil protective systems by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The control must be 'kaizen' with checks and balances between the supervisory and executive part of the corporations (Expert group).
The expert group also felt that regulators' roles, investors' roles, and shareholder activism are other factors that can promote integrity. One of the respondents from this group also suggests that a clear liaison with regulators may help effective enforcement being conducted. Other suggestions made by the expert group were to have effective public announcements pertaining to any corporate governance issues, publishing key performance indicators and having the right company culture.
CONCLUSION
The issue of corporate governance reporting and corporate governance practice is not yet resolved in Malaysian government link companies. This has been the dilemma for security regulators in identifying the approach to assessing company corporate governance practices which are not being reflected from the information disclosed in the company annual report. Che highlighted that users demanded more from the contents of the annual reports and felt that annual reports failed to convey useful information. This has point out how the present rule-based governance system has serious limitations. Ticking off boxes for compliance only leads to a false sense of security that the right judgements and right actions are being taken. There might also be certain fundamental information that is lacking in the Malaysian disclosure framework as a study conducted by Standard and Poors (2004) also revealed that most of the companies in Malaysia still fell short of global disclosure practice (Standard & Poors, 2004; Toh, 2004) .
The study limitation is that the findings do not represent all Malaysian public listed companies. Furthermore, the problems and issues discovered here are based on the respondents' point of view. Thus, a further empirical study is recommended to uncover theses in greater detail.
The study discovered that there are unsolved issues pertaining to corporate governance reporting in Malaysia. Corporate governance reporting does not necessarily represent the company corporate governance practice. The respondents did suggest undertaking verification of the corporate governance reporting to ensure the reliability of corporate governance reporting. The interview exercise conducted identified issues that impact on the current practice of governance in Malaysia. It also helped in identifying ways to address the issues. It is hoped that the dilemma experienced by the security regulators regarding this matter can be eased and the study findings can assist them in improving corporate governance practice in Malaysia.
